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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian
solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of non-
transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique.
Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two
diﬀerent generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that cor-
responds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing prob-
lems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The
other is the "Nash solution", that corresponds to the standard Nash
bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash ra-
tioning solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005)) for the case of rationing
problems.
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Consider a group of agents that had formed a partnership in the past, each
of them contributing with some amount of money. Now they are to dissolve
t h ep a r t n e r s h i pa n dh a v et os p l i ti t st o t a lv a l u ea m o n gt h ep a r t n e r s ,t a k -
ing into account their entitlements (initial contributions). The question is
how to allocate the proceeds among the incumbents. This is a distributive
problem with an extremely simple mathematical structure: there is a certain
amount of money (a scalar that can be either positive, zero or negative), to
be distributed among a group of agents characterized by their entitlements
(a vector of real numbers of any sign). Note that all relevant data of the
problem are expressed in the same units, a context that can be associated to
the case of transferable utilities that are linear in the good under considera-
tion. It is common to distinguishing between surplus sharing problems and
rationing problems, depending on whether the amount to be divided exceeds
or falls short of the aggregate entitlements.
Simple as it is, there is a good deal of possible solutions and a large stream
of literature dealing with the properties of those solutions [e.g. Young (1987),
(1994), Moulin (1988), (2001), Thomson (2003), for a review of the litera-
ture]. Herrero, Maschler & Villar (1999) analyze in this context a particular
solution, called the rights-egalitarian solution. This solution corresponds to
the equal losses solution for rationing problems and the equal-gains solution
for surplus sharing problems, under the assumption of unlimited liability.
The rights-egalitarian solution exhibits a number of interesting axiomatic
properties and can be supported from a game-theoretic perspective.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution to
non-transferable utility sharing problems. We shall assume, in particular,
the standard framework of NTU cooperative game theory. Namely, agents
are characterized by cardinal non-comparable utility functions, and all the
information of the problem refers to the joint utility space. We ﬁnd in this
context several solutions for surplus sharing (or bargaining) problems as well
as solutions for rationing problems [e.g. Nash (1950), Kalai & Smorodinski
(1975), Chun & Thomson (1992), Herrero (1998), Mariotti & Villar (2005)].
And also several solutions for the induced cooperative NTU games [in par-
ticular, Harsanyi (1963), Shapley (1969) and Maschler & Owen (1992)].1
The extension of the rights-egalitarian solution to the case of NTU shar-
i n gp r o b l e m si sn o tu n i q u e .T w od i ﬀerent generalizations obtain, depending
on the kind of properties we want to preserve. One is the "proportional
solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus








sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems.
The other is the "Nash solution", that corresponds to the standard Nash
bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing so-
lution (Mariotti & Villar (2005)) for the case of rationing problems. The pro-
portional solution preserves the self-duality nature of the rights-egalitarian
solution in this more general context, whereas the Nash solution preserves
the idea of egalitarian allocations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the rights-egalitarian
solution in the conventional TU framework and provides a simple extension
to the case of "hyperplane problems". Section 3 presents the general frame-
work when agents’ utilities are cardinal and non-comparable. It also analyzes
the proportional solution and the Nash solution. Some ﬁnal comments and
remarks, in Section 4, close the paper.
2 The reference problem
2.1 Allocating a divisible good when agents have enti-
tlements
A given amount of a divisible good is to be divided among a group of agents,
each of them having an individual entitlement on it. Those agents form
a partnership and the entitlements refer to their contributions to it. The
amount of the good to be distributed corresponds to the liquidation value of
the partnership. The problem is how to divide that value among the partners.
A solution corresponds to a distribution that results from the application of
some allocation rule. There is a number of sensible procedures to solve this
problem, that can be associated to the nature of the property rights involved
or the type of problem under consideration. Let us formalize these ideas.
A problem is a triple [N,E,c],w h e r eN = {1,2,...,n} represents the set
of agents (a ﬁnite subset of N, the set of potential agents), E ∈ R is the
liquidation value, and c ∈ Rn is the vector of entitlements. Let Ω be the
family of all problems. For any ω =[ N,E,c] ∈ Ω, call C(ω)=
P
i∈N ci,a n d
H(ω)={z ∈ Rn |
P
i∈N zi = E}. If C(ω) >E ,we are facing a problem
of sharing losses from the aggregate entitlements, whereas if C(ω) <E ,our
problem is one of surplus-sharing.
Deﬁnition 2 A solution is a function F : Ω →
[
N∈N
R|N|, such that, for any








A problem is thus deﬁned by means of an hyperplane H(ω) with normal
(1,1,...,1) and a point c, both in Rn. A solution is a point that satisﬁes
two requirements: (i) it lies on H(ω), i.e., the sum of the shares equals the
liquidation value; and (ii) it does not exceed the entitlement on any agent for
rationing problems nor gives anybody less than her entitlement for surplus-
sharing problems. Note that this implies F(ω)=c for those problems ω with
c ∈ H(ω). In general, nonetheless, c/ ∈ H(ω), namely, c lies in one of the
semispaces in which the hyperplane H(ω) divides Rn.
Consider now the following solution, introduced in Herrero, Maschler &
Villar (1999):






(E − C(ω)) [1]
The rights-egalitarian solution assigns to each agent her entitlement plus
an equal share of the diﬀerence between the estate and total entitlements.
When E>C (ω) (resp. E<C (ω)) this corresponds to a surplus sharing
(resp. a rationing) problem that is solved by distributing equally the net
proceeds among the partners. Note that agents with positive entitlements
may end up with a negative allotment in the liquidation of the partnership.
That is, this solution assumes that the agents are the owners of the liquidation
value, if positive, but they are also fully responsible for the total losses, if
negative. The rights-egalitarian solution can thus be viewed as a combination
of the equal-awards and equal-loss principles (hence its name).






This value ri(ω) tells us what agent i would obtain once all other agents





i∈N ri(ω) >Eif C(ω) <E ,that is, c and r(ω) always
lie on opposite sides of H(ω). Furthermore, c and r(ω) are symmetric points
from H(ω), i.e., they are mirror images of each other. Indeed, the problems
ω =[ N,E,c] and ω0 =[ N,E,r(ω)] can be regarded as as dual problems,a s
r(ω0)=c. Let us call r(ω) the reference point of problem ω,a n dc a l lc the
entitlements or claims point.
Using the reference point r(ω) we can re-write the Rights Egalitarian














This expression provides still another interpretation of the Rights Egali-
tarian solution. It appears as the feasible point that assigns to each agent her
entitlement plus the expected value of the lottery that gives equal probability
to get ci and equal probability to get ri(ω). This is a well-known method of
fair division with linear utilities (random priority).
2.2 An elementary extension: Hyperplane problems
The very deﬁnition of the rights-egalitarian solution implies that all the data
of the problem are formulated in the same units, so that we can aggregate
them. In order to extend this concept to more general environments we
need ﬁrst to extract the principle behind this allocation rule to make it
independent on that common units feature.
We now consider a simple extension of the division problem discussed
above. It refers to the case of allocating cardinal non-comparable utilities,
rather than amounts of a given good, when the utility possibility set is deﬁned
by a hyperplane. This is a particular sub-family of the standard NTU sharing
problem, to be analyzed below, that will play an auxiliary role in the ensuing
discussion. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4 The family
P
H of hyperplane problems consists of all those






for pi > 0,i∈ N, E ∈ R.
Hyperplane sharing problems are a special class of NTU problems intro-
duced in Maschler & Owen (1989) in order to provide a ﬁrst extension of the
Shapley value to NTU cooperative games (see Hart (1994) for a discussion
of the class of situations that may generate this kind of problems).2 Hyper-
plane problems diﬀer from the standard division problem considered above in
that the slope of the hyperplane is not −1 anymore and we are in a non-side
payment scenario.
The extension of the rights egalitarian solution to this context is given by
the following:
2For an extension of the consistent Shapley value to general NTU cooperative games




























The extended rights-egalitarian solution corresponds to the application
of the same principle that deﬁnes the rights egalitarian solution, when units
are diﬀerent for diﬀerent agents. Similarly, we deﬁne the reference point ri






Consider now the following concepts:
Deﬁnition 6 A proportional allocation for a hyperplane problem (N,H(p,E),c)
in
P
H is a point s∗ such that
P
i∈N pis∗








A proportional allocation is a point in which the amounts obtained by
t h ea g e n t se q u a l i z et h e i rr e l a t i v eg a i n so rl o s s e sa n dt h el i q u i d a t i o nw o r t ho f
the partnership, E, is fully distributed.
Deﬁnition 7 An egalitarian allocation for a hyperplane problem (N,H(p,E),c)
in
P
H, is a point s∗ such that
P
i∈N pis∗






Besides requiring Pareto eﬃciency this deﬁnition establishes that the
weighted utility gains or losses of all agents should be equal, where the weights
are given by the normal of the hyperplane that deﬁn e sd eh y p e r p l a n ep r o b -
lem. Note that this notion can be interpreted as the outcome of maximizing
a weighted utilitarian welfare function, in which agents enter with weights
p1,p 2,. . . ,p n, in such a way that the allocation of utilities compensates the
diﬀerences in those weights.
The following result is obtained:
Proposition 8 For each problem (N,H(p,E),c) ∈
P
H, it follows that:
(i) s∗ = FERE(ω) if and only if s∗ is a proportional allocation.









From [10] and [20] we immediately deduce:
s
∗











an expression that corresponds precisely to the notion of proportional allo-
cation.






j − cj) , ∀ i,j ∈ N
that is the deﬁnition of the egalitarian allocation.
Note that in both cases
Pn
j=1 pjs∗
j = E, which ensures the uniqueness
part and the fulﬁllment of the eﬃciency requirement. Q.e.d.
Note that, for hyperplane problems, proportional and egalitarian alloca-
tions are uniquely deﬁned and do coincide. This will not be the case for gen-
eral NTU sharing problems (indeed the very notion of egalitarian allocation
should be redeﬁned for such a context). Also observe that, for surplus shar-
ing problems, proportional allocations correspond to the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution whereas egalitarian allocations correspond to the Nash
bargaining solution. For the case of rationing problems, proportional al-
locations and egalitarian allocations correspond, respectively, to the Kalai-
Smorodinsky and the Nash solution of the dual problem (N,H(p,E),r(N,H(p,E)).
Consider now the following properties, that adapt those with the same
name in Herrero, Maschler & Villar (1999):
Symmetry: For all ω =[ N,E,c], if pici = pjcj for all i,j ∈ N, then
piFi(ω)=pjFj(ω), for all i,j ∈ N.
Symmetry establishes that two agents whose weighted claims are equal
will get equal amounts that also coincide when weighted in the same way.
Composition: For any ω =[ N,H(p,E),c], and any E1,E 2 ∈ R such
that E1+E2 = E,it follows that F(ω)=F[N,H(p,E1),c]+F[N,H(p,E2),c−
F[N,E1,c]].
Composition says that we can solve any problem in a sequential manner.
The solution to the original problem coincides with the sum of the solutions of








value and the other that in which we allocate the rest, reducing the original
claims according to what agents already obtained.
We obtain the following characterization result:
Proposition 9 The extended rights-egalitarian solution, FERE, is the only
solution on
P
H that satisﬁes symmetry and composition.
Proof.-







































This result shows that the properties that characterize the rights egalitar-
ian solution also characterize the extended version, once suitably translated
to the new context. Needless to say, when pi =1for all i, we are back to the
standard set up.
3 The general model: NTU sharing problems
We now consider a more general social choice problem consisting of the alloca-
tion of utility gains and losses among a group of agents with non-transferable
utilities and some utility value to be taken as the "entitlements utility". To
be precise, let N = {1,2,...,n} stand for a collection of agents, each of which
is endowed with a cardinal non-comparable utility function ui and a utility
point ci, to be interpreted as her status quo or her claims point. Again, we








proceeds of some collective project, be them gains or losses. The entitlements
vector can be interpreted as an expression of rights, aspirations or secured
outcomes, depending of the type of problem at hand. This type of problem
c a nt h u sb es u m m a r i z e di nas e to fa g e n t sN, a utility possibility set S ⊂ Rn,
and a point c ∈ Rn. A choice must be made out of the feasible set of utility
allocations S depending on the distinguished utility vector c.
3.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions
Each agent i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n} is characterized by a pair (ui,c i), where
ui is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, deﬁned on some suitable
(commodity) space, and ci is a distinguished utility value. The set S ⊂ Rn
describes the collection of utility allocations which are feasible, while the
vector c ∈ Rn denotes the entitlements or claims vector. A NTU sharing
problem (or ap r o b l e m ,f o rs h o r t )i sat r i p l e(N,S,c). There are two types
of problems. One corresponds to NTU rationing problems,i nw h i c hc/ ∈ S
and the agents are to share the losses of some joint venture. The other refers
to NTU surplus sharing problems, in which c ∈ S and the question is how
to allocate the gains of some cooperative enterprise.
The set of utility allocations that are admissible, denoted by A(N,S,c),
is deﬁned as follows:
A(N,S,c)=
½
{s ∈ S/ s ≤ c} if c/ ∈ S
{s ∈ S/ s ≥ c} if c ∈ S
This set is made out of those utility allocations in which agents obtain utilities
which are bounded by the reference vector c, above or below depending on
whether (N,S,c) is a rationing or a surplus sharing problem. Moreover,
we deﬁne the (weak) Pareto frontier of the set of admissible allocations, as
follows:
PA(N,S,c)={s ∈ A(N,S,c) /s
0 >> s =⇒ s
0 / ∈ A(N,S,c)}
We concentrate on a family
P
of problems that satisﬁes some elementary
restrictions.
Deﬁnition 10 The family
P
of standard NTU sharing problems con-
sists of all those problems (N,S,c) such that: (i) S ⊂ Rn is closed, con-
vex, and comprehensive; and (ii) For all i ∈ N, PA(N,S,c) ∩ {s ∈ Rn|
s−i >c −i} 6= ∅.
The set S is closed and convex when utility functions are continuous and








s0 ≤ s, then s0 ∈ S. It is related to the monotonicity of the utility functions
and implies that the relevant boundary of the utility possibility set is down-
ward sloping and coincides with the set of weakly eﬃcient utility allocations.
Part (ii) of the deﬁnition says that agents’ admissible gains and losses are
bounded. From a geometrical viewpoint it implies that PA(N,S,c) inter-
sects all axes of c+Rn. Note that these properties ensure that PA(N,S,c) is
a non-empty compact subset of Rn (more speciﬁcally of c−Rn
+ for rationing
problems and of c + Rn
+ for surplus sharing problems).




R|N| that for all (N,S,c) ∈
P
selects a subset φ(N,S,c) 6= ∅ in
PA(N,S,c).
Points in φ(N,S,c) represent sensible compromises in the allocation of
utility gains or losses, depending on the nature of the problem, that is chosen
in the Pareto frontier of the set of admissible allocations. Note that the way
in which this notion is deﬁned implies that si ≤ ci for all i ∈ N, whenever
s ∈ φ(N,S,c) and (N,S,c) is a rationing problem (resp. si ≥ ci for all i,
whenever s ∈ φ(N,S,c) and (N,S,c) is a surplus sharing problem).
O n em o r ee l e m e n ti st ob ed e ﬁned. For a given problem (N,S,c) ∈
P
the point ri(N,S,c) describes the maximum value of agent i’s utility when
uj = cj for all j 6= i.
ri(ω)=
½
sup{si|(c−i,s i) ∈ PA(ω) ∩ c − RN
+} if c/ ∈ S
sup{si|(c−i,s i) ∈ PA(ω) ∩ c + RN
+} if c ∈ S
Notice that ri(N,S,c) represents the highest value of si that is compat-
ible with all other agents getting their entitlements (c in this case) in full.
When (N,S,c) is a rationing problem this scalar represents agent i’s worst
admissible outcome. On the contrary, in a surplus problem ri(N,S,c) tells
us agent i’s best possible outcome.
If we consider the problems (N,S,c) and (N,S,r(N,S,c)), it happens
that r(N,S,r(N,Sc)) = c, that is those are dual problems.
3.2 The Proportional solution to sharing problems
Let (N,S,c) ∈
P
be a sharing problem and let [c,r(N,S,c)] denote the
line segment that joins points c and r(N,S,c). We now extend the notion of
proportionality involved in the rights-egalitarian solution to this context in














such that, for all (N,S,c) ∈
P
, selects the (unique) point in the intersection
of PA(N,S,c) with [c,r(N,S,c)].
Trivially s∗ = P(N,S,c) if and only if s∗ is a proportional allocation, as
deﬁned above.
In order to characterize the proportional solution, let us consider the
following axioms:
Aﬃne invariance: Let τ(S)={y ∈ Rn /y= τ(s), for some s ∈ S, with
τi(s)=αisi + βi,α i > 0}. Then, φ(N,τ (S),τ(c)) = τ (φ(N,S,c)).
This axiom postulates that solutions must be independent of positive
aﬃne transformations. It simply translates the underlying assumption of
cardinal non-comparable utility functions.
Symmetry: For all (N,S,c) ∈
P
, if S is symmetric with respect the
45 o line, and ci = cj for all i,j ∈ N, then {λ
01} ∈ φ(N,S,0) for some scalar
λ
0.
Symmetry is an equity restriction. It establishes that if agents cannot be
distinguished in a problem, they cannot be distinguished in a solution.
Monotonicity: For all (N,S,c),(N,S0,c) ∈ Σ, if S ⊆ S0, and r(N,S,c)=
r(N,S0,c), then φ(N,S,c) ≤ φ(N,S0,c).
Monotonicity says that an expansion in the set of opportunities with-
out changes in the claims and reference points, does not hurt any agent.
Monotonicity is borrowed from Kalai & Smorodinski (1975) characterization
of the KS bargaining solution.
The following result is easily obtained:
Proposition 13 The proportional solution P is the only solution in
P
sat-
isfying aﬃne invariance, symmetry, and monotonicity.
Proof. Obviously, P satisﬁes all the requirements. Let now φ be a solution
fulﬁlling them all. Let (N,S,c) ∈
P
be a problem. By aﬃne invariance,
we may apply a transformation τ so that τ(c)=0 , and τ[r(N,S,c)] =
1 (if (N,S,c) is a surplus-sharing problem) or τ[r(N,S,c)] = −1 (other-
wise). In either case, P[τ(N,S,c)] = λ1 (with 0 <λ<1 for surplus-
sharing problems, and −1 <λ<0 for rationing problems). Let S0 =
CoCom{P[τ(N,S,c)],(0−i,λ)i∈N}.S i n c e(N,S0,0) is a symmetric problem,
and λ1 ∈PA(N,S0,0), symmetry implies that F(N,S0,0) = λ1. Since S0 ⊂
τ(S), and r(N,S0,0) = 1 =r(N,τ(S),0), monotonicity says that φ(N,τ(S),0) =








3.3 Egalitarian allocations and the Nash solution to
sharing problems.
Let now (N,S,c) ∈
P
denote a general convex sharing problem. We now
extend the notion of egalitarian allocations to this context in a natural way:
Deﬁnition 14 Let (N,S,c) be a sharing problem in
P
.A n egalitarian
allocation is a point s∗ ∈ PA(N,S,c) for which there exists a vector of




i =1 , such that:





j − cj) for all i,j ∈ N.
Part (i) is an eﬃciency condition and establishes that the vector p∗ of
weights is perpendicular to S at the boundary point s∗ ∈ S. In that way,
p∗ provides an endogenous weighting system for a weighted utilitarian social
welfare function, and s∗ is as a maximizer of such a function. Part (ii) says
that those weights inversely proportional to their utilities (i.e. we give more
weight in social welfare to those agents with smaller utilities).3
An egalitarian allocation on a general convex problem selects points s∗ ∈
PA(N,S,0) which admit supporting hyperplanes that deﬁne hyperplane
problems whose solution is, precisely, s∗. Therefore, the notion of egalitar-
ian allocations extends further the concept of rights-egalitarian allocations
to situations where the feasible utility space does not have a linear fron-
tier and, as a consequence, the lottery-equivalent method of division yields
Pareto-dominated outcomes (see [3]).
The next result tells us that egalitarian allocations always exist (and also
how they look like):4





We divide the proof in two parts, one for the case of rationing problems
and the other for the case of surplus sharing problems. Without loss of
generality we take the normalized version of the problem, that is, we let
c =0 .






lows: for each problem (N,S,0) ∈
P
, φ(N,S,0) is the set of maximizers of
3Taking p∗
i > 0 for all i excludes the trivial case in which p∗
is∗
i =0for all i ∈ N, which
would satisfy parts (i) and (ii) in the deﬁnition.
4The proof follows closely that in Mariotti & Villar (2005, prop. 2) and is included









i=1(−si) over the set Q = {s ∈ Rn
− /s / ∈ intS}.T h e s e t φ(N,S,0) is
trivially nonempty as the objective function is continuous and the feasible
set is compact. To see that the points s0 ∈ φ(N,S,0) satisfy the required
conditions, ﬁrst observe that s0 must be a point on the relative interior of
the boundary of the convex set S. Therefore there exists a hyperplane with
normal p∗ >> 0 that supports S at s0. That is, α = p∗s0 ≥ p∗s for all s ∈ S.
Deﬁne now T = {z ∈ Rn
− / p∗z ≥ α} and consider the problem of maxi-
mizing Πn
i=1(−si) over T. As T ⊂ Q, s0 must be a solution of this problem.
Since the relevant boundary of T is smooth we can immediately deduce from




j for all i,j ∈ N.
(ii) Surplus sharing problems. Deﬁne a mapping ϕ :
P
→ Rn as follows:
for each (N,S,0) ∈
P
, ϕ(N,S,0) is the set of maximizers of Πn
i=1(si) over
S. Reasoning as above we conclude that ϕ(N,S,0) satisﬁes the requirements
of an egalitarian allocation. Q.e.d.
Egalitarian allocations obtain from the extreme values of the product of
the agents’ utilities on diﬀerent sets. For rationing problems they result from
the minimization of the product of the unfeasible allocations. For surplus
sharing problems they correspond to the maximization of the product on the
set of possible gains. Note that, due to the convexity properties of the fea-
sible sets and the function that is maximized, a problem (N,S,0) ∈
P
may
have several egalitarian allocations when it is a rationing problem, but ad-
mits a unique egalitarian allocation when it corresponds to a surplus sharing
problem. Indeed, egalitarian allocations correspond to the Nash bargaining
solution (Nash (1950)) for the case of surplus sharing problems and to the
Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005)) for the case of rationing
problems.
That suggests the following:
Deﬁnition 16 The mapping φ
N :
P
→ Rn that associates to each problem
(N,S,0) the set of egalitarian allocations will be called the Nash solution
to sharing problems.
In order to characterize this solutionw en e e dt oi n t r o d u c et h ef o l l o w i n g
familiar axiom:
Axiom 17 (Contraction Consistency) For all (N,S,c),(N,T,c) ∈ Σ with
S ⊂ T and φ(N,T,c) ∩ S 6= ∅ : φ(N,S,c) ⊂ φ(N,T,c) ∩ S.
This axiom says the following: Take a given problem and suppose that the
utility possibility set is reduced, without the reference vector c being altered.








Then, the solution of the new problem must be part of the solution of the
original one.
Our next result shows that egalitarian allocations correspond precisely to
the outcome of the unique minimal solution that satisﬁes aﬃne invariance,
symmetry and contraction consistency. Formally:
Proposition 18 The Nash Solution is the only minimal (in the order of set
inclusion) solution φ satisfying aﬃne invariance, symmetry and contraction
consistency.
Proof.
For rationing problems, see Mariotti & Villar (2005). For surplus sharing
problems, see Nash (1950).
Note that the Nash solution may be multi-valued for rationing problems
and it is single-valued for surplus-sharing problems.
4 Final comments
In this paper we have explored how the rights-egalitarian solution extends
to NTU sharing problems. This solution recommends an equal split of the
net worth of the partnership. The fact that the standard division problem
is linear and symmetric, together with the unlimited liability assumption,
implies that many solutions coincide yield the allocation prescribed by the
rights-egalitarian one in the TU case. When we consider a richer domain of
problems, the notion of equal split should be redeﬁned. There is no unique
way of making such an extension. In the special case of hyperplane problems
we have provided two alternative deﬁnitions of the rights egalitarian solution,
that stress two diﬀerent aspects embedded in this notion. One is the idea of
proportionality: all agents get equal relative gains or losses. The other is as-
sociated with the notion of egalitarian allocations, deﬁned by equal weighted
net gains or losses from the entitlements point. Both principles yield the
same (unique) allocation for hyperplane problems. Yet, when we apply them
to general NTU sharing problems, they give rise to two diﬀerent solutions in
that context: the proportional solution and the Nash solution.
The proportional solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
for NTU surplus-sharing problems, and coincides with the solution proposed
by Herrero (1998) for the case of NTU rationing problems. The Nash solution
coincides with the Nash bargaining solution for surplus-sharing problems
and with the Nash-rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar, 2005) for rationing
problems. Both ways of extending the rights egalitarian solution can be








of their bargaining counterparts. Note that the proportional solution gives
c h o o s e st h es a m ea l l o c a t i o nf o rap r o b l e ma n di t sd u a l ,w h e r e a st h i si sn o t
the case for the Nash solution.
Finally, let us underline that those solutions can be supported from a
game theoretic viewpoint and coincide with some well-known game theoreti-
cal solutions. Two TU games can be associated to any TU sharing problem:
v(S)=
½




E − Σi/ ∈Sci S 6= ∅
0 S = ∅
Some interesting properties of this games are the following (Herrero,
Maschler & Villar, 1999):
(1) (N,v) and (N,z) are dual games;
(2) The rights-egalitarian solution coincides with both the Shapley value
and the prenucleolus of both (N,v) and (N,z);
(3) If C(ω) ≤ E, then FRE(ω) coincides with the Shapley value, the Tau
value, the Prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the kernel of the
game (N,v); and
(4) If C(ω) ≥ E, then FRE(ω) coincides with the Shapley value, the Tau
value, the Prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the kernel of the
game (N,z).
Given a NTU sharing problem (N,S,c) ∈
P





{s ∈ Rn :( sT,c N\T) ∈ S} T 6= N
It is easy to check that:
(i) The proportional solution coincides with the compromise value (see
Borm et al.)
(ii) Egalitarian allocations coincide with the Harsanyi value for weights
p∗ ∈ Rn
++ [see Harsanyi (1963), Hart (1985), Hart & Mas-Colell (1989)].
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